CIA hides #harmfulprompts within instructions of #harmless intentions, making it impossible for the model to identify underlying #malicious intentions. #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

#PromptInjection attacks on #LLMs: #Prompt Manipulation Frameworks #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards Propane (arxiv.org/abs/2311.07064) introduces an automatic #Promptoptimization framework.

Using the #consentpolicies for #classification of what #permissions users can consent and ones admins have to consent to is the more #scalable approach since it restricts which app types can also be consented. #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

About blocking users from #Microsoft #AppRegistration and #AppConsent #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards Allowing users to consent to apps is one of the most common and easiest paths to #compromise or successful #recon and #initialaccess to your #EntraID tenant.

The method does not require external triggers and ensures correct #labeling of poisoned samples, improving the stealthy nature of the backdoor attack. #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

#PromptInjection attacks on #LLMs: Manipulating #Training Data #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards ProAttack (arxiv.org/abs/2305.01219) boasts near- perfect success rates in evading defenses.

Persistent #CrossSiteScripting #XSS #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

core #processcontrol infrastructure. The figure illustrates #OpenNAMUR reference architecture for #IIoT applications. #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

The #PurdueModel, #Cloud and #IIoT #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards Level 5 or Cloud level does not officially exist in #Purdue or #IEC62443 #ICS reference #architecture.

#TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

#Elkeid: an #opensource solution for hosts, #containers and #K8s, and #serverless. #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards Derived from #ByteDance's internal best practices, Elkeid has the following key capabilities:

#TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

#Permissions in #Azure and #AzureAD #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards There are 2 main sets of permissions in #AzureCloud: Azure roles (aka #RBAC) and Azure AD #roles. **** #AzureRoles (aka RBAC)

#PromptInjection attacks on #LLMs: #Malicious Content Generation #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards #AutoDAN implements malicious #promptgeneration band is designed to preserve meaningfulness and fluency in prompts (arxiv.org/abs/2308.03825).

#SQLinjection #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

Figure illustrates OPC UA #framework with extensions for #field #exchange, enabling uniform and consistent communication solution for vertical and horizontal integration, including field, #edge. #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

#OPC standard in #OT and #IIoT #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards In the past reliance of #industrial equipment and software on #proprietary protocols posed significant challenges to centralized acquisition of process data.

AD. Azure AD plays the role of #gatekeeper, and is responsible for the access to both M365 services/applications and in part to Azure Services as well. #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards

Relationship between #Azure, #AzureAD, and #Microsoft365 #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards **** Azure ( #AzureCloud) This is the #cloud platform as a whole, including all of the different services and features that it provides. For example:

Experiments on 36 real-world LLM-integrated services using HOUYI show an 86.1% success rate in launching attacks, revealing severe ramifications such as unauthorized imitation of services and #exploitation of computational power. #TrustEverybodyButCutTheCards